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Inflation over the last 5 years has remained below 3 percent. 
Many  economic  observers  applaud  these  results,  arguing  that 
inflation has ceased to matter much  in the decisions  of consumers 
and  businesses.  Others  such  as  Martin  Feldstein  (1996),  Lee 
Hoskins  (1991), and Jerry Jordan  (1993) advocate  further gains on 
the  inflationary  front.  Feldstein,  for  instance,  argues  that 
reducing  the  inflation  rate  to  zero  would  ameliorate  the  tax 
distortions caused by inflation, producing substantial gains to the 
economy.  He estimates that to achieve price stability the Federal 
Reserve would have to engineer a recession that reduces real gross 
domestic  product  by 5 percent.  Feldstein  holds  that  these  costs 
are far outweighed  by the benefits that would occur from reducing 
the misallocation  of resources  (in jargon, the deadweight  losses) 
due  to  inflation.  What  he  overlooks  in his  analysis  is how  the 
costs  and benefits  of such a policy  would  be  shared.  Who  would 
bear the burdens  from disinflationary  monetary  policy?  Who would 
reap  the  benefits?  Would  such  distributional  consequences  be 
desirable  in the present  economic environment? 
This  Brief  attempts  to  answer  these  questions  first  by 
considering  based  on  economic  principles  how  different  sectors 
would  be  affected  by  disinflationary  policy.  The  traditional 
@lmoney*'  channel  of  monetary  policy  implies  that  employment  in 2 
interest-sensitive  industries  should fall the most.  The lVcreditt@ 
channel implies that small, financially-constrained  firms should be 
hurt  more  than  large,  financially-stable  firms.  A  slowdown  in 
aggregate activity working  through  either channel would  burden low- 
income  workers  more  than  high-income  workers.  Since  minorities 
tend to have lower wages than whites, disinflationary 
disproportionately  affect  them.  Lenders such as bond 
gain by an unanticipated  decrease  in inflation. 
policy should 
holders would 
This  Brief  next  examines  evidence  concerning  the 
distributional  effects  of  contractionary  policy.  Evidence  from 
impulse-response  functions  indicates  that  interest-sensitive 
industries  such as construction  and durable goods and small firms 
are harmed  disproportionately  by contractionary  monetary  policy. 
Examination  of a social accounting matrix reveals that a slowdown 
in construction and durable goods will affect especially low-income 
urban workers.  Econometric evidence shows that unemployment  among 
blacks  and  hispanics  increases  approximately  twice  as  much  as 
unemployment  among  whites  following  contractionary  policy. 
Evidence  also  indicates  that  Treasury  bond  prices  are  driven 
primarily  by news  of inflation,  and will  appreciate  as inflation 
declines. 
Corroborating evidence concerning  these  effects is obtained by 
examining  the  period  from  1979-82  when  the  Fed  raised  interest 
rates  and contracted  economic  activity  while  reducing  inflation. 
Employment  in  durable  manufacturing  fell  18  percent  over  this 
period and employment  in construction dropped 15 percent.  Profits 3 
of  small  firms  declined  much  more  than  profits  of  large  firms. 
Unemployment  among  blacks  rose  9.5  percentage  points  to  reach  21.2 
percent  while unemployment  among  whites  increased  less  than  half  as 
much  and  never  exceeded  10  percent.  Long-term  Treasury  bonds  in 
1982,  the  first  year  that  inflation  dropped  appreciably,  yielded 
their  best  performance  ever  with  total  returns  exceeding  40 
percent.  At  this  time  the  wealthiest  10  percent  of  households 
held  almost  95  percent  of  all  bonds  and  trusts.'  Thus  examining 
the  disinflationary  period  from  1979-1982  confirms  the  econometric 
findings  that  contractionary  policy  harms  low-income  families  and 
benefits  bond  holders,  who  predominantly  belong  to  high-income 
families. 
This  Brief finally  considers  whether  a further  redistribution 
from  poorer  individuals  to wealthier  individuals  would  be desirable 
at  present.  Over  the  past  20  years  incomes  of  those  on  the  upper 
tail  of  the  income  distribution  have  increased  steadily  while 
incomes  of the  poorest  decile  have  decreased  almost  30 percent  and 
of  the  second  poorest  decile  almost  20  percent.*  Commenting  on 
this  trend,  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Alan  Greenspan  stated  that  it 
could  be a major  threat  to  our  society  and  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  York  President  William  McDonough  warned  that  it could  endanger 
our  ability  to  go  forward  together  as  a  unified  society.3  Faced 
with  these  distributional  problems,  now would  be a particularly  bad 
time  to  engineer  a  monetary  disinflation.  Rather,  the  fact  that 
inflation  has  remained  quiescent  despite  the  fact  that  unemployment 
has  stayed  below  6 percent  since  September  1994  suggests  that  now 4 
would be a good time for the Fed to "test  the  waters" by continuing 
to let unemployment  fall.  Even if the monetary authorities did not 
stimulate  the  economy,  abstaining  from  tightening  following 
positive  employment  news would  be helpful.  Allowing  the  jobless 
rate  to  fall  in this way would  especially  benefit  those  most  at 
risk  in  our  society--poorer  families,  minorities,  inner  city 
workers,  and people on welfare. 
Economic Theory and the Distributional  Effects of Monetary  Policy 
Monetary  Policy,  Interest-Sensitive  Industries,  and  Small  Firms 
In traditional  macroeconomic  models disinflationary  monetary 
policy  slows  the  economy  by  raising  interest  rates.  The  Fed 
directly controls the federal funds interest rate, the rate on one- 
day loans between banks.  By increasing current and expected future 
values  of the  funds rate, the Fed can raise  longer-term  interest 
rates and reduce stock prices.  These changes increase the interest 
cost of using capital.  As the cost of capital rises,  spending  on 
capital goods, houses, and durables should decrease.  The reduction 
in spending then causes output in these sectors to fall.  As output 
and thus the incomes of those working in these industries decline, 
other sectors of the economy will be harmed.  The largest burden, 
though,  should  be borne  by  interest-sensitive  industries  such as 
construction  and durable goods. 
This  direct  effect  of  contractionary  monetary  policy  on 5 
interest-sensitive  industries  can  be  amplified  by  its  effect  on 
firms'  access  to  credit.  As  Bernanke  (1993)  and  Gertler  and 
Gilchrist  (1994) have discussed,  firms with  better  balance  sheet 
positions are more able to finance their activities either directly 
using  their  own  funds  or  indirectly  using  their  net  worth  as 
collateral  to obtain  credit.  Firms that have weak  balance  sheet 
positions  or  that  are  otherwise  constrained  in  their  access  to 
capital  markets  are more dependent  on banks to  finance  inventory 
investment  and capital  formation.  For  these  credit-constrained 
firms, a monetary contraction can severely curtail  their  ability to 
operate.  As  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1994)  have  discussed,  a 
monetary tightening,  by increasing interest rates, can worsen cash 
flow net of interest and thus firms  ‘ balance  sheet positions.  As 
Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988) have  shown,  a  monetary  contraction 
engineered  through  an open market  sale by the Federal Reserve  can 
decrease  bank  loans  (assuming  that  bonds  and  bank  loans  are 
imperfect  substitutes).  The  reduction  in  collateralizable  net 
worth and in bank loans caused by a monetary contraction  restricts 
working capital and thus economic activity among firms with limited 
access to capital markets. 
Gertler and Gilchrist have argued that smaller firms are more 
likely to be constrained  in their access to credit.  They are more 
likely  to  obtain  funds  from  banks  than  from  equity,  bonds,  or 
commercial paper.  They are less likely to be well-collateralized. 
Further,  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  argued  that,  because  credit 
constraints  bind  a  larger  number  of  small  firms  in  a  downturn, 6 
changes  in monetary  policy  should  have  a  larger  effect  on  small 
firms in bad times than in good times.  A monetary contraction when 
the economy  is in a recession  can have a much more serious  effect 
on small firms than a monetary  expansion would when the economy is 
growing.  Thus,  if  credit  constraints  help  propagate  monetary 
policy,  small  firms  should  be  disproportionately  burdened  by 
disinflationary  monetary policy, especially during recessions. 
Contractionary Policy,  Low-Income  Individuals,  Minorities,  and  Wall 
Street 
There are many reasons why contractionary  policy  should hurt 
low-income  individuals  more  than  high-income  individuals. 
Blanchard  (1995) argued that a negative macroeconomic  shock such as 
a tightening  of monetary  policy will harm those on lower rungs of 
the occupational  ladder much more than those on higher rungs.  He 
further argued that unskilled workers have much larger labor supply 
elasticities  than skilled workers.  Decreases  in wages  of skilled 
workers will not decrease their labor supply much, while decreases 
in wages  of unskilled  workers will sharply decrease  theirs.  Thus 
a business cycle downturn that reduces wages will lower employment 
much more  for unskilled  workers  than  for skilled  ones.  Fischer, 
Dornbusch,  and Schmalensee  (1988) argue that blue-collar  jobs tend 
to  be  affected  much  more  than  white  collar  jobs  by  negative 
aggregate  disturbance.  Blinder  and  Esaki  (1978)  found  that 
negative macroeconomic  shocks that increase the unemployment  rate 7 
by one percentage  point  take about  0.28% of national  income away 
from the lowest 40% of the income distribution  and give  it to the 
richest  20%.  Thus  low-income,  low-skilled  individuals  should 
suffer more  from a monetary  contraction. 
It  is well  known  that African-Americans  tend  to have  lower 
incomes than whites  (see, for example, Bound and Freeman,  1992). 
The reasons  for this wage  gap are less clear. As Card and Lemieux 
(1994) discuss,  it could reflect  factors  such as discrimination, 
productivity  differences,  or  differential  access  to  job 
information.  The implication of the wage gap for monetary policy, 
however,  is clear.  The  brunt  of  contractionary  monetary  policy 
should  fall  on  blacks  and  other  minorities  earning  lower  wages 
rather than on whites. 
Another  way  to  shed  light on  the  distributional  effects  of 
disinflationary  monetary policy is to examine the types of workers 
in  the  industries  most  affected.  As  discussed  above, 
contractionary  monetary  policy  should  burden  primarily  interest- 
sensitive sectors such as construction and durable goods.  Evidence 
presented  below  indicates  that  this  is  the  case.  It  is  then 
possible  to use  a Social  Accounting  Matrix  (SAM) for the  United 
States to trace through the effects of a decline in output in these 
industries  on the distribution  of income by socio-economic  group. 
These  groups  could  be  disaggregated  by  location  (rural  versus 
urban), union membership,  and other characteristics. 
While disinflationary  monetary  policy should harm  low-income 
individuals,  it  should  benefit  bond  market  investors  and  other 8 
creditors.  In  order  to  hold  a  bond,  lenders  require  not  only  an 
expected  real  return  but  also  compensation  for  expected  inflation. 
Assume,  for  instance,  that  to  hold  a  given  bond  wealth-holders 
required  a 2% expected  real  return  and  a 3% inflation  premium.  The 
anticipated  nominal  return  on  the  bond  would  thus  be  5%  If 
inflation  declined  unexpectedly  to  1%  and  the  nominal  return 
remained  at  5%,  then  the  real  return  on  the  bond  would  actually  be 
4%.  Thus  lenders  would  receive  a  2%  higher  real  return  than  they 
required,  provided  involuntarily  by  borrowers.  Since  Feldstein's 
(1996)  proposal  is not  currently  expected  to  be  implemented,  it  is 
not reflected  in  forecasts  of  inflation.  If  it were  implemented, 
it would  bring  about  an  unanticipated  decline  in  inflation.  Such 
a decline  would  produce  a redistribution  to creditors  from  debtors. 
In  practice  wealthier  households  are  creditors  while  businesses, 
the  government,  and  poorer  households  are  debtors.  Thus  one  would 
expect  an  unanticipated  disinflation  to  help  wealthier  households 
at  the  expense  of  other  sectors. 
Evidence on the Distributional  Effects of Monetary  Policy 
Evidence  from Econometrics  and Social Accounting  Matrices 
The  discussion  above  indicates  that  disinflationary  monetary 
policy  should  have  differential  effects  across  the  economy.  It 
shoulddisproportionatelyharminterest-sensitive  industries, small 
firms, low-income  individuals,  and minorities.  It  should  benefit bond  holders.  This 
these distributional 
9 
section  summarizes  a variety  of evidence  on 
effects of monetary policy. 
To  calculate  the  effect  of  monetary  policy  on  employment 
disaggregated  by industry and race and on small firms the impulse- 
response  methodology  of  Sims  (1980)  is  useful.  This  approach 
involves  calculating  unexpected  changes  in monetary  policy  (the 
impulse)  in month t and noting the predicted  effect on employment 
and other variables  in months  t, t+l, t+2, etc.  (the responses). 
To measure  unexpected  changes  in monetary  policy  a method  similar 
to  that  employed  by  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1992) and  Christiano, 
Eichenbaum,  and  Evans  (1996) was  used.  They  measured  monetary 
policy by unexpected  changes in the federal funds rate.  The funds 
rate has often  been used  as the Fed's  instrument  in implementing 
monetary  policy.  Christian0  et  al.  noted that including  an index 
of sensitive commodity prices along with variables  such as GDP and 
the  GDP  deflator  in  a  prediction  equation  for  the  funds  rate 
produced  a  credible  measure  of  monetary  policy  in  that  it  was 
correlated  in  the  expected  way  with  variables  such  as  bank 
reserves,  real  GDP,  employment,  and  prices.  Following  their 
approach  unexpected  changes  in  the  federal  funds  rate  were 
calculated by regressing  the funds rate on a constant,  six lags of 
itself, and six lags of aggregate industrial production growth, the 
inflation  rate,  the  log of  a  commodity  price  index,  the  log  of 
nonborrowed  reserves,  the  log of total  reserves,  and  the  log of 
employment.  The  portion  of  the  funds  rate  that  could  not  be 
predicted  using these variables  (the residual) was treated  as the 10 
unexpected  change  in the  funds rate.  The predicted  responses  of 
employment  and  other  variables  to  these  funds  rate  shocks  were 
noted.  Although  standard  errors  are  not  always  presented,  the 
effects reported  are statistically  significant.  More  information 
on the  data  sources  and  the  sample  periods  are presented  in the 
Appendix. 
Table  1 presents  the responses  of employment  after  18 months 
by industry to an unexpected  increase in the funds rate.  For all 
the industries examined the response peaked after about 18 months. 
The two sectors that are most harmed are construction  and durable 
goods.  As discussed above, these are sectors that one would expect 
to  be  affected  by  monetary  policy  because  they  are  interest- 
sensitive.  For construction, an unexpected increase in  the  federal 
funds  rate  of  one-standard-deviation  (equal  to  0.55  percentage 
points) decreases  employment  after 18 months by an average  of 0.7 
percent.  For  durable  manufacturing,  an  unexpected  funds  rate 
increase  of  0.55  percentage  points  decrease  employment  after  18 
months on average by 0.5 percent.  The following section will help 
put  these  magnitudes  in perspective  by  examining  the  changes  in 
employment  in  these  industries  during  the  period  of  monetary 
contraction  from  1979-1982.  Table  1  further  indicates  that 
employment  in  sectors  such  as  nondurable  goods,  government, 
transportation,  and mining  are barely affected.  The results  thus 
indicate  that  contractionary  monetary  policy  disproportionately 
affects  employment  in  sectors  such  as  construction  and  durable 
goods. 11 
To  shed  further  light  on  the  types  of  workers  affected  by 
declines  in these  industries  a social accounting  matrix  (SAM) is 
useful.  This Brief  uses the SAM constructed  by Roland-Holst  and 
Sancho  (1992).  Table  2  presents  evidence  concerning  how  a  $1 
decline  in output  in the  construction  and  durable  goods  sectors 
will  affect  the  income  of  different  socioeconomic  groups.4  The 
Table indicates that non-union workers who are not covered by union 
contracts are harmed much more than union workers or other covered 
workers.  These  in non-covered  jobs are much more  likely to be in 
low-income jobs.  Thus these results indicate that monetary policy 
is disproportionately  harming those on the lower tail of the income 
distribution.  The  Table  also  indicates  that  urban  workers  are 
harmed  much  more  than  rural  workers.  It  thus  appears  that 
contractionary  monetary  policy  can  worsen  the  urban  blight 
afflicting  so many cities at present. 
Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1994)  used  the  impulse-response 
technique  to investigate the  differential  affect  of monetary policy 
on small and large firms.  They examined several episodes when the 
Fed  tightened  monetary  policy  and  noted  how  manufacturing  firms 
were affected.  They classified these firms as small if their total 
sales were below  the  30th percentile for manufacturing  firms.  They 
found that  contractionary  monetary  policy  reduces  sales  of small 
firms much more  than sales of large firms.  They also  found that 
small firms exhibit an asymmetric response to monetary policy  (but 
large  firms  do  not).  Small  firms  are  harmed  much  more  by 
contractionary  monetary  policy  during  recessions  than  they  are 12 
helped  by  expansionary  monetary  policy  during  expansions.  Thus 
Gertler and Gilchrist's  evidence indicates that small firms bear a 
greater  burden  than  large  firms  from  contractionary  monetary 
policy. 
The  impulse-response  methodology  can be used  to  investigate 
the  effects  of monetary  policy  on unemployment  disaggregated  by 
race.  The results  are presented  in Figure  1.  To understand  the 
graph,  note that  it shows the effect  over time  of an increase  in 
the  federal  funds  rate  of  one-standard-deviation  (equal to  0.55 
percentage  points)  on  unemployment  disaggregated  by  race.  The 
evidence  indicates  that  contractionary  monetary  policy  increases 
unemployment  among  all  races,  with  the maximal  effect  occurring 
between  one  and  two  years.  The  unemployment  rate  among  whites 
following a 55 basis point increase in the funds rate increases on 
average by about 0.075 percentage points and the unemployment  rate 
among hispanics  and blacks by about twice as much.  The following 
section will help put these magnitudes  in perspective  by examining 
the changes  in unemployment  by race during the period  of monetary 
contraction  from 1979-1982.  The evidence presented  in the Figure 
indicates  that minorities,  who tend to be concentrated  in lower- 
income jobs, suffer more than whites  from contractionary  monetary 
policy. 
The  evidence  above  indicates  that  contractionary  monetary 
policy  reduces  employment,  with  the  burden  falling 
disproportionately  on  minorities, low-income individuals, and  those 
working  for  interest-sensitive  industries  and  small  firms.  How 13 
does  such  a  decrease  in  employment  affect  the  bond  market?  To 
investigate  this  Coppock  and  Thorbecke  (1997)  examined  how 
unexpected  changes  in  employment  affected  Treasury  bond  returns. 
They  found  that  news  of  higher  employment  depressed  bond  returns. 
To  determine  why  they  examined  what  other  assets  were  harmed  by 
news  of  strong  employment.  They  found  a  strong  and  statistically 
significant  relationship  between  an  asset's  exposure  to  inflation 
and  monetary  policy  and  the  amount  the  asset's  return  fell 
following  news  of  strong  employment.  So  strong  employment  hurts 
stocks  and  bonds  because  it can  cause  inflation  and  because  it can 
cause  the  Fed  to tighten.  For Treasury  bonds  Coppock  and  Thorbecke 
found  that  fear  of  inflation  explains  more  of  the  fall  in  returns 
than  concern  about  tighter  monetary  policy.  Thus  bond  market 
participants  would  prefer  that  employment  not  be to high  to prevent 
the  risk  of  an  overheating  economy  and  inflation. 
Further  evidence  that  bonds  would  benefit  from  reducing 
inflation  comes  from  several  studies.  Mishkin  (1990)  and  Campbell 
and  Amner  (1993)  show  that  long-term  bond  prices  respond  primarily 
to news  about  future  inflation.  Their  evidence  also  indicates  that 
news  of  higher  inflation  pushes  bond  returns  down.  Thus 
contractionary  policy  that  reduces  inflation  should  produce  large 
capital  gains  to  bond-holders  over  time.5 
The Example  of the Volcker Deflation 14 
These distributional  effects  of contractionary monetary policy 
can  be  seen  by  studying  the  clearest  recent  example  of  a 
disinflation,  the period  from  1979-1982  that  economists  call the 
@@Volcker  deflation."  In October  1979, with  inflation  exceeding 
lO%,  Fed  Chairman  Paul  Volcker  declared  his  commitment  to  fight 
inflation.  He allowed the federal funds rate to increase 800 basis 
points.  Long-term  Treasury  and corporate bonds both increased  by 
about  500 basis  points.  These  higher  interest  rates  slowed  the 
economy and contributed  to two recessions,  one in 1980 and one in 
1981-82.  Finally,  in late 1982, with unemployment  at a post-war 
high of over 10 percent and inflation below 4 percent, the Federal 
Reserve  eased  on  monetary  policy.  How  was  the  burden  of  this 
disinflation  shared across the economy? 
Table 3 shows the percentage change in employment by industry 
from  September  1979  to  the  end  of  1982.  Other  things  equal 
employment should increase over this period because the population 
increases and the size of the economy grows.  The results show that 
employment  in  durable  manufacturing  was  down  18  percent  and 
employment  in construction  was  down  15 percent.  The  only  other 
sector  whose  employment  fell  close  to  this  amount  was 
transportation,  where employment fell 3 percent.  Thus the brunt of 
the  disinflation  fell  on  workers  in  durable  manufacturing  and 
construction. 
Figure 2 shows earnings of small and large firms.  Following 
Fama and French  (1995) firms are classified as small if the market 
capitalization  of their  stocks  is below the median  value  for the 15 
New  York  Stock  Exchange.6  Earnings  of small  and  large  firms  are 
divided  by  the  book  values  of the  firms  to  make  the  two  series 
comparable.  As  Fama and French  discuss,  until  1981 profitability 
showed little relationship to firm size.  However, during the 1981- 
82 recession the profits of small firms declined much more than the 
profits of large firms.  Finally, after the recession, the earnings 
of large firms quickly recovered while the earnings of small firms 
never really did.  Rather, earnings of small firms have remained at 
historically  low levels.  Thus small firms were harmed much more by 
the Volcker  deflation  than large firms 
Figure 3 shows unemployment by race over the period.  At  their 
highest  points,  African-American  unemployment  reached  21.2 percent, 
hispanic  unemployment  hit  15.7  percent,  and  white  unemployment 
remained  below  10 percent.  From October  1979 until  unemployment 
peaked  at the end of 1982 African-American  unemployment  increased 
9.5 percent, hispanic unemployment  increased 7.1 percent, and white 
unemployment  increased 4.5 percent.  Minorities clearly paid a much 
higher  price  than  whites  for  the  reduction  in  inflation  that 
occurred. 
Bonds,  on  the  other  hand,  soared  as  inflation  went  down. 
Inflation  in 1981 was high, just short of 9 percent.  In 1982, on 
the other hand, inflation fell below 4 percent.  Long-term Treasury 
securities  provided  a total return  in 1982 exceeding  40 percent. 
This  annual  return  on Treasury  securities  was  easily  the highest 
return  ever. 
This  evidence  indicates  that  during  the  Volcker  deflation 16 
employment  in  durables  and  construction  and  among  minorities 
plunged  while  bond  prices  soared.  The  discussion  above  implies 
that lower-income  individuals will suffer disproportionately  from 
the  decrease  in  employment  in  durable  goods  and  construction. 
Which  households  will  gain  from the  increase  in bonds?  As Moore 
(1989) and  Niggle  (1989) discuss,  the  wealthiest  10 percent  of 
households  held almost 95 percent of all  bonds  and  trusts  in  1982. 
Thus the 40 percent return on bonds in 1982 yielded a huge windfall 
to the wealthy. 
Policy  Implications 
Both the econometric results and the evidence from the Volcker 
deflation  present  a  consistent  picture  of  how  the  burdens  of 
disinflationary policy are distributed.  Employment in construction 
and durables  decreases  disproportionately.  Within  these  sectors 
income  falls  most  for  uncovered  workers,  who  belong  to  the 
secondary  labor market.  Minority  unemployment  increases twice as 
much as white unemployment.  Small firms' profits decline more than 
large firms' profits.  Bond market investors gain.  Disinflationary 
policy thus redistributes  wealth from low-income families to high- 
income  families.  Would  a  further  transfer  in  this  direction, 
produced  through  contractionary  policy, be desirable? 
To answer this question  it is useful to look at how income is 
distributed presently  in the U.S.  Katherine Bradbury  (1996) of the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank of Boston has shown that  for the poorest  10 17 
percent of families, real income declined almost 30 percent between 
1973  and  1994,  for  the  second  poorest  decile  real  income  fell 
almost 20 percent over this period, and it was not until the median 
decile that incomes increased at all over the al-year period.  The 
top four deciles, on the other hand, showed steady increases, with 
the  largest  increase  (over 20 percent)  going  to the  top  decile. 
These results contrast with the period between 1947 and 1973, when 
all ten deciles experienced  steady increases in wages of about the 
same  size.  Commenting  on  this  recent  trend  towards  increasing 
inequality  Fed Chairman  Alan Greenspan  stated that  it could be a 
major  threat  to  our  society.7  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of New  York 
President  William  McDonough  similarly 
differences  in  income  between  high-  and 
endangering  our  ability  to  '@go  forward 
society.@@8 
argued  that  growing 
low-skilled  workers  are 
together  as  a  unified 
Given the economic difficulties  facing lower-income  families 
and  the  consequent  threats  to  our  society,  engineering  a 
disinflationary  recession  now  would  be  inappropriate.  Such  a 
slowdown  would  burden  low-income  families,  minorities,  and 
interest-sensitive  industries while providing  a bonanza to fixed- 
income investors.  Bonds are held primarily by wealthy households, 
and a further redistribution  to these investors from poor families 
could risk tearing the fabric of our society. 
While disinflationary  monetary policy would be deleterious  at 
present,  the  risks  of  more  expansionary  monetary  policy  seem 
smaller.  As Alan Greenspan  (1997) testified, although unemployment 18 
has  fallen  to  about  5.25  percent,  inflation  remains  quiescent. 
Greenspan  attributes  the  failure  of  unit  labor  costs  and  thus 
prices  to  increase  as  the  economy  expands  to  heightened  job 
insecurity.  Workers are willing to accept lower wage increases  in 
return  for  greater  job  security.  He  suggests  that  their 
willingness  to  forgo  demands  for wage  increases  could  be due  to 
fears of job skill obsolescence.  He cites  other  factors  such as 
international  competition, the decline of unions, the deceleration 
of health care costs, and deregulation as also moderating pressures 
for wage  and price  increases.  Thus the danger  that  expansionary 
monetary  policy will trigger  inflation seems less now than in the 
past. 
This  being  so,  now  seems  like  an  appropriate  time  to  let 
employment  grow  rather  than  limiting  job expansion.  In the past 
the Fed sometimes applied the monetary brakes when employment grew 
more  than  expected.  As  discussed  above,  Coppock  and  Thorbecke 
(1997)  found  that  prices  of  assets  harmed  by  contractionary 
monetary policy fell after news of strong employment growth.  This 
indicates  that  Wall  Street  expected  the  Fed  to  tighten  when 
employment  expanded  quickly.  Prominent  Fed watcher  David  Jones 
(1994)  said  that  employment  was  Greenspan's  favorite  series  to 
watch, and he was more inclined to tighten monetary policy when it 
grew  quickly.  The  problem  with  restricting  employment  to  fight 
inflation  is that  it forces  low-income  workers  and minorities  to 
pay the lion's share of the costs of controlling  inflation.  With 
these  groups  suffering  and  inflation  risks  low,  now  is  an 19 
appropriate  time to let the economy grow rather than limiting the 
amount  employment  can  increase  and  unemployment  can  fall.  As 
Council of Economic Advisors Chair Joseph Stiglitz stated, allowing 
the jobless rate to remain low will particularly  help workers  such 
as  inner-city  blacks  and  people  on  welfare  who  have  difficulty 
finding jobs.' 
Some  people  might  object  that  if the  Fed  was  perceived  as 
being less willing to tighten when employment increased bond market 
participants  would demand a larger inflation risk premium and push 
up  long-term  rates.  While  this might  be true  there  are  several 
reasons why this argument is not compelling.  First, by not raising 
short-term  interest  rates  when  there  are  signs  of  economic 
strength,  the Fed could prevent a lot of the increases  in longer- 
term  rates  that  have  occurred  recently  (see Thorbecke,  1996  and 
Coppock  and  Thorbecke,  1997).  Second,  the  U.S.  Treasury  has 
recently  issued  inflation-indexed  bonds,  giving  those  concerned 
about  inflation  an instrument  free of inflation  risk.  Third,  if 
inflation did not materialize,  investors would bid interest rates 
back down.  Fourth, as Blinder  (1996) discusses, the Fed should not 
focus narrowly  on the interests of the bond market  but broadly  on 
the interests  of the country.  If it was determined  that allowing 
unemployment  to fall was a sensible policy, the Fed should follow 
it even  if the policy  displeased  bond  investors  who would  prefer 
zero inflation risk. 20 
conclusion 
Inflation over the last 5 years has remained below 3 percent. 
While  many  applaud  these  outcomes,  economists  such  as  Feldstein 
(1996)  advocate  a  monetary  policy-induced  recession  to  lower 
inflation  further.  In  principle  the  burden  of  a  monetary 
contraction  should  fall disproportionately  on  interest-sensitive 
sectors,  small  firms,  low-income  workers,  and  minorities.  The 
benefits  of  a  disinflation  should  accrue  primarily  to  creditors 
such  as  bond  market  investors.  Evidence  from  impulse-response 
functions, a social accounting matrix, and  the  1979-82 disinflation 
all  indicate  that  this  is so.  Employment  in industries  such  as 
construction  and durable goods falls much more than employment  in 
other sectors.  Those who lose their jobs in these sectors tend to 
be  those  in  the  secondary  labor  market.  Unemployment  among 
minorities  increases by twice as  much as unemployment among whites. 
Bond  prices,  on  the  other  hand,  soar  as  inflation  declines.  A 
monetary  contraction  would  thus  redistribute  income  from  poorer 
families to wealthier  ones. 
The fact that lower-income  families are suffering  in today's 
global  economy  combined  with  the evidence  discussed  by Greenspan 
that inflation risks are low indicates that rather than contracting 
the economy, the Fed should let it expand.  Allowing  employment  to 
grow would disproportionately  benefit  low-income  families,  inner- 
city  blacks,  and  those  on  welfare.  Fine-tuning  the  economy  by 
preventing unemployment  from falling, on the other hand, would hurt these  individuals  who  are  most 
central  bankers  such  as  Federal 
McDonough  are  warning  that 
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at  risk.  Given  that  conservative 
Reserve  Bank  of New  York  President 
growing  income  disparities  are 
endangering  our  ability  to  go  forward  together  as  a  unified 
society,  implementing  policies  to benefit  low-skilled  workers  is of 
particular  moment.  "Testing  the  waters I@  by  letting  unemployment 
fall  would  benefit  these  workers,  promoting  both  distributive 
justice  and  social  cohesion.  While  this  strategy  would  involve 
some  risk  of  price  increases,  the  Fed  would  have  ample 
contain  any  incipient  inflation  before  it became  embedded 
and  prices. 
time  to 
in wages 22 
Table  1: Impulse Response of Sectoral Employment after 18 Months to 
One-Standard  Deviation  Shock to the Federal Funds Rate 
Sector 
Response to One-Standard 




Wholesale  Trade 
Finance,  Insurance, 
Real Estate 
Services 




-0.00693**  (0.00235) 
-0.00491**  (0.00169) 
-0.00261**  (0.00076) 













*Significant  at the 10% level. 
**Significant  at the 5% level. 23 
Table 2: The Effect of a One Dollar Decline  in Sectoral Output  on 
the Income of Various  Socioeconomic  Groups. 
Socioeconomic  Group 
Sector 
Construction  Durables 
Union  -0.164  -0.130 
Non-union  Covered  -0.017  -0.015 
Non-union  non-covered  -0.612  -0.539 
Rural  -0.030  -0.025 
Urban  -0.807  -0.692 
Source: Roland-Holst  and Sancho  (1992). Table  3: Percentage  Change  in Employment 
1979  to  the  end  of  1982. 
24 
by Industry  from  September 
Sector  Percentage  Change  in  Employment 
Durable  Goods  -18.3 
Construction  -14.6 
Transportation  -3.1 
Government  -1.3 
Wholesale  Trade  -0.5 
Retail  Trade  1.8 
Nondurable  Goods  4.2 
Mining  4.5 
Finance,  Insurance, 
Real  Estate  6.9 
Services  11.0 
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Appendix. Data Sources and Sample Periods 
Data  on  industrial  production,  the  inflation  rate,  commodity 
prices,  the  federal  funds  rate,  total  reserves,  nonborrowed 
reserves,  employment  by  industry,  and  unemployment  by  race  were 
obtained  from  the  Haver  Analytics  data  tape.  Since  data  on 
commodity  prices  were  available  from  Haver  beginning  in  January 
1967,  the  sample  period  used  to obtain  the  estimates  in Table  1 was 
January  1967  -  December  1995.  Since  data  on  unemployment 
disaggregated  into  white,  black,  and  hispanic  categories  were 
available  from  Haver  beginning  in  March  1973,  the  sample  period 
used  to  obtain  the  estimates  in Figure  1 was  March  1973  - December 
1995. 29 
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Notes 
1. See Moore  (1989) and Niggle  (1989). 
2. See Bradbury  (1996). 
3.  Greenspan's  statement  was  made  in  his  Humphrey-Hawkins 
testimony  before Congress  in July 1995. McDonough's  statement was 
quoted  in The New Yorker,  16 October  1995, p. 113. 
4.  The  results  are  presented  for 
pattern holds  for non-white workers. 
white  workers,  but  the  same 
5.  It  is  true  that  disinflationary  monetary  policy  that  raises 
current  and  expected  short-term  interest  rates  can  depress  bond 
returns.  However,  Thorbecke  (1996) found  that  bond  prices  also 
decline if bond market investors perceive that the  Fed is too timid 
about  raising  interest  rates  to  fight  inflation.  Further,  the 
evidence of Campbell and Amner  (1993) and Mishkin  (1990) that bond 
prices  are primarily  driven by news of inflation  implies that the 
benefit  to  bond  market  participants  of  disinflationary  monetary 
policy over time outweighs the short run costs of higher  interest 
rates. 
6.  The data up to 1986 are taken from Fama and French  (1995) and 
after  that  from  the  Compustat  data  tape.  To  facilitate 
interpretation  the data for small firms up to 1986 are the average 
of  the  two  small  firm  series  that  Fama  and  French  used  and 






they employed:  Since earnings  of small  firm  in both 
precipitously  in 1981-82 and earning of large firms in 
did not taking averages  in this manner  should present 
picture of what happened to earnings during the Volcker 
7.  Testimony  before Congress, July 1995 
8. Quoted  in The New Yorker,  16 October  1995, p. 113. 
9.  Washington  Post,  11 January  1997, p. D2. Working  Paper  Series 
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